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AGAINST PRACTICE
Anthony V. Alfieri*
By
William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welsh Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S.
Shulman. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Pp. x, 225. $40.
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW.

"[Tihe challenge of professional preparation for the law [is] linking the interests of educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the
public the profession is pledged to serve-in other words, participating in
civic professionalism" (p. 4).
INTRODUCTION

Legal education is against practice. More than a half century after
Jerome Frank's call for a clinical-lawyer school,' and nearly two decades
after the MacCrate Commission's plea for professional development, 2 many
American law schools continue to privilege theory over practice in teaching,
scholarship, and institutional mission. In teaching, law schools elevate formal knowledge and case-dialogue pedagogy over practical judgment and
policy analysis. In scholarship, law schools favor doctrinal synthesis and
critique over field-based research on "law in action." And in mission, law
schools promote a self-regarding vision of lawyer-guild professionalism,
role differentiation, and dyadic adversarial conflict over civic professionalism, role integration, and community-based social justice.
The animus of theory-centered traditions toward practice obscures the
interdisciplinary breadth, empirical richness, and moral import of lawyer
roles and relationships. The same animus reduces professionalism to a
largely aspirational function sounded in tropes to alumni, students, and the
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and the participants in Yale Law School's Conference on Frontiers in Social Justice Lawyering: Critical Race Revisited.
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Strochlic, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance, as
well as Cheryl Bratt and the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their theory/practice commitment.
I.

See Jerome Frank, A Pleafor Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Jerome Frank,

Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
2.

See THE MACCRATE REPORT (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds., 1994);

TASK FORCE ON LAW ScH. & THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR Ass' N. LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1992). More recently, see Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRAC-

TICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).

1073

1074

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 107:1073

bar. The results of this animus reinforce conventional roles and relationships
among lawyers, clients, and communities; fortify the socioeconomic inequalities of entrenched civil and criminal justice systems; and preserve the
disparate treatment suffered by women and minorities in the legal services
marketplace. Acquiescence to role convention and sociolegal inequality diminishes the curricular importance of professional development
opportunities and programmatic social justice initiatives. Absent a meaningful commitment to professional development and social justice in the law
school curriculum, institutional mission succumbs to the reigning orthodoxies of the adversary system and the ethics of the legal marketplace.3
The theory/practice dichotomy in law school teaching, scholarship, and
mission relegates clinical-lawyer instruction to the periphery of legal education and consigns clinical faculty to a subordinate caste status differentiated
by inferior compensation, limited governance, and segregated space.4 Despite this academic caste hierarchy, an increasing number of law schools
have made progress in integrating clinical-lawyer perspectives into their
pedagogies, scholarship, and curricular missions. 5 Indeed, numerous schools
at all tiers now embrace policy-oriented, problem-solving methods of pedagogy; recognize interdisciplinary, practice-based scholarship; and
incorporate "lawyering" skills courses into the traditional core curriculum.
Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of
neutrality and scientific technique, and individualist norms of liberal legalism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism severed from differencebased identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to
both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in
claims of neutral lawyer judgment, technical "lawyering" process values,
and client-centered representation indifferent to the other-regarding interests
of community building.6
3.

See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTI-

TUTIONAL CHANGE

(1997);

MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL

STREET LAWYER (2004); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2007).
4. See pp. 92-93. Broadly defined, clinical educators include instructors supervising inhouse clinics and extemships, or teaching "lawyering" skills simulation courses. Elliott S. Milstein,
ClinicalLegal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics,Externships, and Simulations, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 375, 375-76 (2001). On disparities in clinical faculty compensation and governance,
see CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007-2008 SURVEY 31 (2008),
available at http:/www.csale.org/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf (reporting on clinical faculty
members' voting rights and ability to participate in law school committees); Taskforce on Clinicians
& the Acad., Am. Ass'n of Law Sch. Section on Clinical Educ., Draft Statement of Fundamental
Principles 2, 6, 8-10 (Apr. 30, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing unequal governance rights and
inferior compensation and resources). The Draft Statement of Fundamental Principles cites the
"caste system" perpetuated by the unequal status of clinical educators in law school institutional
governance and "its stigmatizing impact" within the law school faculty. See Taskforce on Clinicians
& the Acad., supra, at 9.
5. Jill Schachner Chanen, Re-Engineering the JD: Schools Across the Country Are Teaching
Less About the Law and More About Lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 42; Jonathan D. Glater,
Training Law Students for Real-Life Careers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at B9.
6. In-house clinics attempt to resist this tendency by addressing client identity and community in multidimensional contexts replete with emotional, narrative, spatial, and symbolic
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This Review examines the theory/practice dichotomy in legal education
through the prism of the Carnegie Foundation's 7 Educating Lawyers:
Preparationfor the Profession of Law. Descriptively, it argues that the
Foundation's investigation of law school curricular deficiencies in the areas
of clinical-lawyer skills, professionalism, and public service overlooks the
relevance of critical pedagogies in teaching students how to deal with difference-based identity and how to build cross-cultural community in diverse,
multicultural practice settings differentiated by mutable and immutable
characteristics such as class, gender, and race. Prescriptively, it argues that
the Foundation's remedial call for the curricular integration of clinicallawyer practices similarly overlooks the utility of critical pedagogies in
teaching students not only how to understand difference, but also how to
represent difference-based clients and communities here and abroad.
The Review is divided into two parts. Part I explores the Carnegie Foundation's assessment of law schools in preparing students through
contemporary case dialogue and in integrating alternative-practice pedagogies. Part II analyzes the ramifications of the Foundation's report for the
application of alternative curricular frameworks, particularly critical pedagogies grounded in difference-based identity and community. These
frameworks are briefly sketched in a study of the West Coconut Grove Historic Black Church project at the University of Miami Law Schools
Community Economic Development and Design ("CEDAD") Clinic. The
case study demonstrates both the difficulty and the necessity of developing
theory/practice pedagogies effective in dealing with difference-based identity in the context of representing communities of color.
I. (MIs)EDUCATING LAWYERS: THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION CRITIQUE

The Carnegie Foundation's critique offers an abridged cultural and social history of legal education predicated on the vision of law as a "public
profession" and of lawyers as agents charged with "important public responsibilities" (p. 1). The critique gleans this sociocultural history from a
cross-section of sixteen law schools of varying tiers surveyed during the
1999-2000 academic year. The Foundation views the preparation of lawyers
in law school as "the crucial portal to the practice of law" (p. 1), illuminating "the daily practices of teaching and learning through which future legal
professionals are formed" (pp. 1-2).
To better understand legal education and its implications for the profession, the Foundation focuses on "how learning occurs" in law and in other
professions such as medicine (pp. 2, 192-94). Focusing on how law school
complexity. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town ", 95 CAL. L.

REV. 1829 (2007).
7.

William Sullivan is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of

Teaching; Anne Colby is Co-Director of The Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the Professions
Program; Judith Wegner is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lloyd Bond is a Senior

Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lee Schulman is President of The Carnegie Foundation.
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"forms minds and shapes identities," it links the common aim of all professional education to the cultivation of specialized knowledge and
professional identity (p. 2). Next it highlights the "modes of teaching and
learning" that law schools use to accomplish that common aim (p. 3). Two
modes of teaching and learning stand central to this analysis-the classroom
experience of Socratic case dialogue' and the clinical experience of lawyer
apprenticeship. Both modes of pedagogy contribute to the development of
legal understanding and the formation of professional identity.'0 Yet, both
produce different and often inconsonant sets of legal skills and professional
norms. That dissonance, echoed throughout the law school experience, challenges the Foundation to search the history of legal education for means of
pedagogical reconciliation and curricular integration.
A. The Evolution of Case-DialoguePedagogy

The Carnegie Foundation traces the current dissonance in the professional enterprise of legal education to the evolution of the modern law
school as a contested, hybrid institution (pp. 4-5, 78-82). This evolution
displays a historic tension between the conventions of the practitioner community and the canons of the modem research university. From the
practitioner community, law schools derive traditions of craft, judgment, and
public responsibility. From the research university, law schools deduce ideals of knowledge, reason, and truth-academic ideals that emphasize
objective, quantitative measurement and formal knowledge abstracted from
the daily context of practice (p. 5). Akin to philosophical positivism, this
widely adopted academic epistemology heralds the value of importing "scientifically generated" forms of knowledge as "technical instruments for
managing events in more rational ways" (p. 5). Legal positivists grasp "law
as an instrument of rational policymaking-a set of rules and techniques
rather than a craft of interpretation and adaptation embedded in the common
law" (p. 5). This institutional seizure of scientific methodology and technical rationality, the Foundation shows, "undermined the academic legitimacy
of practical knowledge" in legal education (p. 5).
To the Carnegie Foundation, the waning legitimacy of practical knowledge under positivist legal theory stemmed from a failure to blend academic

8. On the reformist backdrop of the case-dialogue method, see Bruce A. Kimball, Young
ChristopherLangdell, 1826-1854: The Formnationof an Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC.
189 (2002). See also David D. Garner, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the TwentyFirst Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307.
9. On the curricular adaptations of the apprentice system, see James E. Molitemo, An
Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the
Academic Atmosphere. 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83 (1991).
10. The Carnegie Foundation observes: "Professional schools are not only where expert
knowledge and judgment are communicated from advanced practitioner to beginner, they are also
the place where the profession puts its defining values and exemplars on display, where future practitioners can begin both to assume and critically examine their future identities." P. 4.
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and practitioner traditions of legal training in "reciprocal enrichment."" That
failure breached the legal profession's "contract with society" (p. 21). Repairing this breach and restoring public trust requires academic/practitioner
goal integration, a reappraisal of signature pedagogies, and a recovery of
professionalism (pp. 21-33). For the Foundation, the opportunity to transform legal education springs from the potential union of innovative practice
pedagogies, professional norms, and case-dialogue traditions (pp. 33-43).
The predominance of case-dialogue pedagogy in law schools signals the
in legal analysis
triumph of formal knowledge and scientific rationality
. ..
. . (pp.
12
5-7). Marked by the ascendance of university-housed academic specialists,
the rise of an abstract jurisprudence of "general ideas and principles" in
American law produced a new legal scholarship of doctrinal synthesis and a
new method of training in legal knowledge "separate from learning to practice" (pp. 5-6). The new scholarship assimilated the model of formal,
scientific discourse, engrafting it on constitutional, statutory, and common
law materials (pp. 5-7). Assimilation resulted in the shifting of academic
research norms away from practice contexts toward an emulation of the artsand-sciences disciplines (pp. 11-12). The new methodology likewise favored
legal knowledge and reasoning over practice skills, 3 deferring practice experience until postgraduate entry into the profession. 4 Preference for formal
knowledge and objectivity helped rationalize the legal process, the Foundation concedes, but worked to diminish the relationship of legal education to
morality and public responsibility (p. 7). The consequent "loss of orientation
and meaning" among faculty and students reveals the "shadow side" of
modem legal education and fuels recurrent accusations of professional selfabsorption and public irresponsibility (p. 7).
For the Carnegie Foundation, case dialogue symbolizes legal education's
signature pedagogy. 5 The reliance of the case-dialogue method on the inclass tactics and dynamics of the Socratic process furnishes students cognitive instruction in the realist task of fitting rules to contextually unmoored
facts.16 According to the Foundation, the Socratic process affords flexibility
11.
P. 5; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
12. See John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing Bar Must Rescue American Legal Education from the Misguided Priorities of American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1135, 113536, 1138-39 (1997); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the
Research University and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965,
1968-78 (1999).
13.

See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO

"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" (2007).

14. The need to teach new associates law-office management exemplifies such misplaced
deferment. See Debra Moss Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law Students Need to
Know the Business of Being a Lawyer, 71 ALB. L. REV. 201 (2008).
15. Pp. 47-50; see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1
(1983); Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About it, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 609 (2007).
16. See Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a Nev Legal Realist
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483,494-508 (2007).
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in adjusting case dialogue and exposes indeterminacy in the application of
rules (pp. 47-50). To a more limited extent, it also expands the interpretative

and policy repertoire of students. Nonetheless, the Foundation contends that
the case-dialogue method generates diminishing returns, particularly when
extended beyond the first-year classroom.' 7 This decline in pedagogical efficacy" is not seen elsewhere in professional education, for example in
medical school, where a continuum of theory/practice integration holds curricular sway.' 9 To correct the curricular overreliance on case-dialogue

methods in law school, and to counter the ethical relativism and nihilism
that may ensue, 2° the Foundation considers alternative methods of practicebased instruction that enhance the formative, identity-making dimension of
legal education.
B. The Turn to Practice: Clinical Programsand
"Lawyering" Courses

The Foundation's turn toward practice integration borrows from apprentice traditions and the cognitive sciences. Earlier invoked in the MacCrate
report, apprentice traditions help to overcome the trade school stigma often
2
associated with practice
• 22pedagogies. ' Bolstered by advances in the cognitive study of learning,

the traditions now give greater meaning to the

formation of professional expertise (pp. 95-100). The apprentice model of
practice supplies cognitive techniques and operating procedures to enrich
legal knowledge and professional effectiveness. Those techniques include
case and composition theory, legal writing, skill simulation, and negotiation
(pp. 102-13). Case theory in particular affords students an opportunity to
move from novice experimentation to expert practice and, ultimately, to

17. Pp. 75-78; see also Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade:An Empirical Examination
of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235 (2001).
18. For empirical research on pedagogical efficacy, see Stefan H. Krieger, The Development
of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law Students: An Empirical Study, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2006).
19. Pp. 59-84; see also Andrew J. Rothman, PreparingLaw School Graduatesfor Practice:
A Blueprintfor Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 875 (1999); cf Molly Cook et al., American Medical Education 100 Years after the Flexner
Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1339 (2006).
20. On ethical relativism and nihilism in legal education, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizing the Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1204 (1995) (book review).
21.
Pp. 91-93. For sympathetic accounts of the MacCrate report, see Russell Engler, The
MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 109 (2001), and Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward Integrated
Learning Experiences, I CLINICAL L. REV. 401 (1994).
22. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 329-32 (1995); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 60 (1992).
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formal knowledge. This process fosters the exercise of judgment in context
and builds professional identity and purpose."
To surmount the positivist ethos of the research university, the Foundation recommends practice pedagogies that unite the disparate parts of legal
education by reconnecting craft with formal knowledge. It locates this unity
in an alternative conception of craft-informed knowledge animating the
work of engaged practitioners in clinical, "lawyering" skills, and legal writing courses. For this practitioner community, "law is a tradition of social
practice that includes particular habits of mind, as well as a distinctive ethical engagement with the world" (p. 8). Understanding law as a practice
tradition tied to cognitive development, skill, and social interaction redefines
legal education as a practical discipline. To the Foundation, "the practical
disciplines embody forms of knowing that blur distinctions among cognition, action, and intention" (p. 8). Learning to apply these forms of knowing
requires the teaching of practical judgment.
The Carnegie Foundation defines practical judgment in terms of "the
ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations" (p. 9). On this
definition, judgment is in part a function of professional expertise. The skillful application of professional judgment "means involvement in situations
that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowledge" (p. 8). The Foundation explicitly aims to enhance professional
judgment through critical analysis. This craft-guided critical analysis treats
professional practice as an instance of "judgment in action" (p. 9). In order
"to make practice more effective, comprehensible to students, and open to
critical assessment" (p. 9), the Foundation notes, analysis demands reflection.
Clinical education satisfies this demand by providing contexts in which
students "observe, simulate, attempt, and then critically reflect on their
work" (p. 9). The clinical case conference and practicum employed in the
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project, for example, provide contexts in which students assess community-based practice situations,
critically reflect on church-client and community needs, and reach collaborative judgments about remedial legal, political, and social solutions.
Indeed, the clinical pedagogy of participatory analysis, critique, and reflection enables CEDAD students to broaden their perception of faith-based
racial identity and deepen their appreciation for black church ministries and
congregations, thus enlarging their professional repertoires of experience
and judgment. Experiential learning of this sort revives the normative purposes of the profession (p. 10).
The Carnegie Foundation's endorsement of the application of theoretical
work to the domain of practice generates alternative pedagogies and analytic
frameworks culled from the interpretation of client and community contexts
and case narratives. Unsurprisingly, the narratives reveal "much more being
23. See pp. 111-25. The Foundation argues that "case theory calls attention to the important
role played by the problems of particular clients in specific situations in giving impetus to the legal
process." P. 124.
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taught and learned in any pedagogical situation than can be consciously abstracted in the form of procedures or techniques" (p. 11). The lessons of
client and community narrative carry moral consequences for legal relationships, political alliances, and social activities, faith-based and otherwise. 24 A
decisive dimension of a lawyer's multiple roles and relationships "is responsibility for clients and for the values the public has entrusted to the
profession" (p. 12). Basic to legal knowledge, that responsibility drives the
increased curricular integration of "lawyering" skills courses. 21
C. ProfessionalReformation

The Carnegie Foundation's integrated model of legal education combines "conceptual knowledge, skill, and moral discernment" with the
capacity for situated judgment (p. 12). Bridging the gap between analytical
and practical knowledge and revitalizing professional integrity hinge on (1)
extending the field of legal knowledge and (2) honing the moral capacity for
good judgment acquired by students in clinical settings,26 such as the
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project. The mutual enlargement of
theoretical and practical legal knowledge, the Foundation maintains, "will
progress best when it is directed by a focus on the professional formation of
law students" (p. 13).
1. CurricularIntegration

The Carnegie Foundation's vision of integrity-promoting purposive education rests on the curricular integration of legal analysis, practical skill, and
professional identity (pp. 191-202). Legal analysis, the Foundation observes, serves as "the prior condition for practice because it supplies the
essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the world
through the medium of the law" (p. 13). Practical-skills training requires
introduction to the cognitive perspective of practice and, moreover,
immer27
sion in the development of advocacy and counseling methods. Professional
identity" uses professionalism, social responsibility, and ethics as the catalysts for an integrated legal education. To merge legal analysis and practical

24. On the normative lessons of narrative, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991). See generally
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110-42(2000).
25.
Pp. 11-12. The Carnegie Foundation defines "lawyering" courses to include legal writing
instruction, simulated practicums, and in-house clinics. P. 17. See generally Arturo L6pez Torres,
MacCrate Goes to Law School: An Annotated Bibliography of Methods for Teaching Lawyering
Skills in the Classroom, 77 NEB. L. REV. 132 (1998).
26.

Seep. 13.

27. The practical skill of intervention in advising and counseling clients grows through modeling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate
pedagogies blending formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction.
28. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of
Professional Identity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555 (2007).
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skills in a significant way, the Foundation insists, "professionalism needs to
become more explicit and better diffused throughout legal preparation. 29
The Carnegie Foundation's framework for a more integrated approach to
legal education recognizes that reliance on law school case-dialogue pedagogy for the purposes of professional socialization produces adverse,
unintended consequences (pp. 185-88). Chief among those consequences is
the neglect of practical judgment, lawyering skill, and professional identity.
To mitigate such widespread neglect, the Foundation proposes comprehen-

sive change to the first-year and upper-level curricula.30 Borrowing from
business and medical school education, it urges continuity and innovation in
case-teaching methodology in the classroom and in the field (pp. 197-200).
Innovation requires not only leadership and vision, but also learning-based
assessment procedures appropriate to case pedagogies. By design, assessment procedures measure both conceptual knowledge and competence.
Measures of conceptual knowledge rest on traditional standards of evalua-

tion inside the classroom. Measures of competence, by contrast, require
alternative criterion-referenced appraisals of "lawyering" skills and ethicalsocial development outside the classroom (pp. 164-80). The appraisal of
classroom and fieldwork performance, the Foundation points out, depends
on an institutional climate of reform and intentionality (pp. 180-84).
2. ProfessionalIdentity and Purpose

To the Carnegie Foundation, "the formation of competent and committed professionals deserves and needs to be the common, unifying purpose"

of legal education (p. 13). This mission gives "renewed prominence to the
ideals and commitments that have historically defined the legal profession in

America" (p. 13). Renewing the ideals and commitments of the profession
depends on communication and reciprocal learning among faculty and students through curricular reorganization and innovative pedagogy.
Reorganization moves legal ethics and professionalism to the center of the

29. P. 14; see also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Teaching a ProfessionalResponsibility Course:
Lessons Learned from the Clinic, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 149, 152-54 (2002) (describing a situation
where professionalism would have resolved a clinic dispute).
30. Pp. 194-200; see also Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching Legal
Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education into the First Year, 12
CLINICAL L. REv. 441,476-99 (2006); Margaret M. Russell, Beginner's Resolve: An Essay on Collaboration, Clinical Innovation, and the First-Year Core Curriculum, I CLINICAL L. REv. 135, 14756(1994).
31.
Pp. 188-92; see E. Tammy Kim, Who's Learning What? Toward a participatory legal
pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 633, 635-37 (2008) (arguing that proper leadership from
students, faculty, and law school administration may help the enterprise of legal education "move
one step closer to ensuring that the legal profession represents and responds to the needs of the
entire citizenry"); Clifford S. Zimmerman, "Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation": Reflections
on Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 AIUZ. ST.
L.J. 957, 971-86 (1999). Zimmerman expresses "concern about the framework for evaluation of
teaching methods" Id. at 971.
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curriculum. 12 Innovation incorporates ethics and professionalism instruction
throughout the curriculum.
Research on education and moral development underscores the importance of the pervasive method of legal ethics instruction.33 That method

treats legal professionalism as an ideal, a practice, and a means of social
contribution. An ethically sensitive apprenticeship model correlates professional identity with the public value of "doing justice. 3 4 When ethical-social
values pervade the apprenticeship process, professional identity and purpose
gain a greater sense of responsibility, seen for example in the expanding
commitment of the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove where
attendance at evening church meetings and Sunday services has become
routine. Enhanced responsibility augments the presence of moral-legal dialogue in law school and the potential for pro bono work, demonstrated for
example in the cooperative development of a lawyer referral network jointly
administered by the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove and
black lawyers volunteering under the auspices of Miami's Wilkie D. Ferguson Jr. Bar Association.
Pervasive professional responsibility dialogue links the "lawyering"
roles of advocacy and service. It also unifies the cognitive, practical, and
ethical-social dimensions of the apprenticeship process around the focal
point of competence.3 5 That process installs a continuum of teaching, learning, and modeling positive professional ideals across first-year and upperlevel experiences. Engaging professional ideals in core courses, "lawyering"
practicums, and legal clinics demonstrates the possibility of purposive legal
education (pp. 145-61).
II.

(RE)EDUCATING LAWYERS: ALTERNATIVE

THEORY/PRACTICE PEDAGOGIES

The Carnegie Foundation's model of educational reform falters in
slighting the integration of critical pedagogies in formal legal analysis,
practical-skills training, and professional-identity building. Descriptively
the model overlooks alternative theoretical frameworks and practice pedagogies acknowledging difference-based identity, context, and community.
Prescriptively the model omits remedial strategies aimed at integrating
32. See Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Legal Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most hnportant Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. CHli. L.J. 719, 735-39 (1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching
Legal Ethics, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1043, 1051-57 (2007).
33. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 50-56
(1992); Alan M. Weinberger, Some Further Observations on Using the Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics in Property Courses, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1203 (2007).
34. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, the
Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 219, 248-55 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal
Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REV. 23, 38-45 (2000).
35. See Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Coipetence, 43 J.LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993) (pointing out that law schools "construct competence" and
change notions of competence).
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difference-based identity, context, and community into law school pedagogy inside and outside the classroom. Reforming law school and
reeducating the legal profession require a fuller description of the role of
identity and community in "lawyering" and a bolder prescription for their
pedagogical and practical integration. Many of these pedagogies are embedded in clinical education and legal education more generally yet remain
isolated and segregated from the broader curriculum. Exhibited in clinical
and hybrid outreach programs to minority racial groups and subordinate
cultures, the pedagogies demand alternative academic and experiential training regimens for students emphasizing civic leadership. 36
A. CriticalPedagogiesin Legal Education
Critical pedagogies extend the modem traditions of liberal legalism, particularly their condemnation of ascribed caste or status hierarchies, and
embrace the postmodem contingencies of racial and cultural identity. Affirmation links liberal legalism and postmodern contingency in a shared
commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice
norms. These norms guide interdisciplinary, community-based collaborations
employed in representing historically stigmatized groups encountered in
Miami's West Coconut Grove and elsewhere. The Carnegie Foundation ignores such alternative norms and their critical frameworks.
The Foundation's disregard of alternative norms and frameworks in formulating its model of educational reform inhibits the comprehensive
transformation of practice pedagogies tied to legal analysis, "lawyering"
skills, and professional identity. Pedagogical transformation requires closer
attention to identity, context, and community in everyday practice, especially in dealing with minority racial groups and subordinate cultures.
Critical pedagogies prove useful to representing historically stigmatized
groups not only in condemning ascribed caste or status hierarchies, but also
in understanding the complexity of racial and cultural identity, especially
faith-based identity in individual, group, and institutional settings. Both liberal legalism and postmodern contingency aid this revision by challenging
neutral pedagogical perspectives and engendering practical cross-cultural
collaborations.
A transformative commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims
in rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation.37
The Carnegie Foundation's stance of neutrality, entrenched in the MacCrate

36. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596 (2006) (urging
law school graduates to aspire to be leaders as well as counselors); Donald J. Polden, Educating
Law Students for Leadership Roles and Responsibilities, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 353 (2008) (same).
37. The stance of neutrality combines elements of scientific rationality and doctrinal analysis. See Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1959).
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report, 38 tolerates the use of stereotype and stigma in the "lawyering" process. Difference-based stereotype and stigma based on race, gender, or
sexuality deforms the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral content of advocacy. The classically liberal purpose of client-centered "lawyering" fails to
cure stereotypes of client or group difference. 9 Without cross-cultural and
difference-based identity analysis, client-centered methods perpetuate
stigma-induced marginalization in law and society. Suffused in neutrality,

these methods seldom call for the contextual reassessment of client and
community identity. However, only that reassessment will alter lawyer perception and interpretation of client difference, and facilitate lawyer-client as
well as lawyer-community interaction across differences.40 Reassessment
entails4 lawyer introspection, cultural self-awareness, and cross-cultural
skills. '

Client-collaborative reassessment confronts stereotypes that impute
marginalizing traits or behaviors to communities of color inside and outside

their church congregations. 42 Confronting stereotypes through cross-cultural
collaboration involves the identification of segregating differences, the exploration of multiple explanations for client behavior, and the elimination or
mitigation of lawyer bias. 43 Although the depth of lawyer bias and the force
of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collabo38. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L.
REV. 593, 593 (1994) ("[The MacCrate Report] enacts a particular picture of the lawyer, as principally a litigator, a 'means-ends' thinker who maximizes an abstracted client's goals."); Burnele V.
Powell, Somewhere Farther Down the Line: MacCrate on Multiculturalism and the Information
Age, 69 WASH. L. REV. 637 (1994).
39. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of ClientCentered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006) (examining the history, development,
and theory of the client-centered approach to lawyering); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?-Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L.
REV. 509 (2008).
40. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1266-81 (2002); Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You
Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003). Blasi noted that
"it is unlikely that ... [there will be] long-lasting or widespread reductions in prejudice, so long
as we leave unchanged the institutional and social structures that facilitate the perpetuation of
stereotypes and the resulting discrimination, unintended and otherwise." Blasi, supra, at 1266.
See also Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)lntended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. I, 3 (2003) (asserting that law schools should teach students to recognize cultural bias because
such bias could be based on "untruths, stereotyping, or a simple lack of respect for differences").
41. See Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural
Self-Awareness, II CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005); see also David Dominguez, Beyond Zero-Sum
Games: Multiculturalism as Enriched Law Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175, 178
(1994) (promoting a "negotiable learning" model where students work closely to negotiate key
decisions which provides opportunities "to reconcile divergent cultural interests, value judgments,
and priorities").
42. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People From The Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 401-11 (1997).
See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
L. REV. 33, 64-67 (2001); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across
Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373 (2002).
43.

CLINICAL
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ratively enlarging the scope of client participation in the "lawyering" process through individual decision making and collective action transforms
practical judgment. 44 Further, it sometimes expands client and community
problem solving beyond case-specific needs to encompass issue-focused,
45
neighborhood-wide campaigns, thereby motivating broader affinity groups
to participate in democracy-enforcing legal-political advocacy about commonly shared grievances such as crime, fair housing, and municipal equity.46
B. CriticalPedagogiesin the Classroom
The Carnegie Foundation's neglect of critical norms and frameworks in
designing its model of educational reform hampers the comprehensive transformation of classroom pedagogies fastened to legal analysis, "lawyering"
skills, and professional identity. To be inclusive and wide-ranging, 4
pedagogical transformation requires the classroom infusion of multiple
identity narratives, layered contextual descriptions, and silenced commu48
nity histories. The contextual exploration of client narrative and
community history in parsing stories of dominant/subordinate group competition and sociocultural conflict emerges out of a mixture of classical
liberal and critical-outsider jurisprudence coupled with interdisciplinary
investigation. 49 Liberal jurisprudence gives voice to authentic selfelaboration, individual liberty, and collective equality. Critical jurisprudence reveals caste status, class subordination, and the stigmas of race,
gender, and sexuality.50 Interdisciplinary investigation discloses ethnographic, psychological, and sociological insight.
Tailored to both clinical and nonclinical classrooms, mixed jurisprudential and interdisciplinary pedagogies of practice illuminate the cognitive,
affective, and normative elements of legal roles and relationships in guiding

44. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
427, 486-515 (2000); Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12
CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 589-611 (2006).
45. See Gerald P. Lrpez, Keynote Address, Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORDL. REV. 2041, 2049 (2005); Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around
Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004).
HAM

46. See Lucie White, "Democracy" in Development Practice:Essays on a Fugitive Theme,
64 TENN. L. REV. 1073 (1997).
47.
LA RAZA

See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a MulticulturalSociety, 8
L.J. 140 (1995); Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices

Helps All Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402 (1998).
48. Compare DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH (1991), with Jacobs, supra note 42, at 346 (observing that the client-lawyer
models employed by clinical programs "fail to address ... the effects of race, class and, to a lesser
extent, gender").
49.

See Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A "Signature Pedagogy" for Clinical

Education?, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2007).
50. See Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of
Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2093-99 (2005); David B. Wilkins, Essay, Identities and Roles:
Race, Recognition, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998).
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lawyer, client, and community decision-making. 5 Built on learning theory," those elements comprise intuition," empathy,54 and emotional
intelligence. 5 Each of these behavioral elements is relevant to practice and
7 externprofessionalism
training in "lawyering" courses, 6 simulations,
55
59
ships, and university-wide, cross-disciplinary clinical settings."
Joining jurisprudential and interdisciplinary classroom pedagogies also
elucidates the values and techniques of ethical discretion and moral decision

making in the "lawyering" process. 60 Among the historic black ministries of
West Coconut Grove, the calls for moral education, 6' theology,62 spiritual-

51.
See generally THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALING PROFESSION (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin,
"Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical
Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000).
52.
See Robin A. Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students Through Individual Learning
Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 213 (1998); Fran Quigley, Seizing the DisorientingMoment: Adult Learning
Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 (1995).
53.
See Kandis Scott, Clinical Essay, Non-Analytical Thinking in Law Practice: Blinking in
the Forest, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 687 (2006).
54.
See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 135 (2002); Peter Margulies,
Re-Framing Empathy in ClinicalLegal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 605 (1999).
55.
See Ann Juergens, Practicing What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Community Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching, I I CLINICAL L. REV. 413 (2005); John E.
Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education: Strengthening
the Professionalismof Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323 (2008).
56. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
619, 623 (2008) ("Clinical and simulation work should guide students to think critically about the
interplay of logic, psychology, and culture .... "); Judith L. Maute, Lawyering in the 21st Century:
A Capstone Courseon the Law and Ethics of Lawyering, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1291 (2007).
57.
See Karen Barton et al., Authentic Fictions: Simulation, Professionalism and Legal
Learning, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 143 (2007).
58.
See Mary Jo Eyster, Designing and Teaching the Large Externship Clinic, 5 CLINICAL L.
REV. 347 (1999); Carolyn R. Young & Barbara A. Blanco, What Students Don't Know Will Hurt
Them: A Frank View From The Field On How To Better Prepare Our Clinic and Externship Students, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 105 (2007); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Professionaland EthicalIssues in
Legal Externships: Fostering Commitment to Public Service, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2295 (1999).
59.
See Kathleen Coulborn Faller & Frank E. Vandervort, InterdisciplinaryClinical Teaching
of Child Welfare Practice to Law andSocial Work Students: When World Views Collide, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 121 (2007); Spencer Rand, Teaching Law Students to PracticeSocial Justice:An InterdisciplinarySearch for Help Through Social Work's Empowerment Approach, 13 CLINICAL L.
REV. 459 (2006); Janet Weinstein, Coming ofAge: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary
Education in Law Practice,74 WASH. L. REV. 319 (1999).
60.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 119-22 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1320-33 (2006). Katyal maintains that there is a "need for law schools to start a
moral conversation and to encourage students to practice law in an 'ethical' manner." Katyal, supra,
at 121.
61.
See Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness,and Morality," 4 CLINICAL
L. REV. 1 (1997); Thomas Shaffer, Legal Essay, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 195 (1986).
62.
See Melissa Harrison, Searching for Context: A Critique of Legal Education by Comparisonto Theological Education, 11 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 245 (2002).
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ity, 63 and religion 64 in "law" converge in a moral conversation about "lawyering." 65 The Carnegie Foundation implicitly invites this conversation by
promoting a vision of civic professionalism inspired by renewed public responsibility. 66 That vision hinges on the capacity for reflective moral
judgment acquired from ethical, legal, and social skills, and applied in

classrooms, clinics, and communities

Realizing the Foundation's vision of

student ethical-social development and law school-community collaboration
warrants new forms of theory/practice integration 68 and outreach. 69
Critical forms of theory/practice pedagogy regularly emerge from client

and community collaborations in clinical education, often in the field of
civil rights and poverty law. Erected here, four critical frameworks stand out

in affording pedagogical opportunities for curricular revision.70 Fundamental
to community-based clinical education, the frameworks view the law as a
social and cultural practice and look skeptically upon legal judgments as
descriptively incomplete. Moreover, the frameworks view legal reasoning as

63. See Calvin G.C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in a Law
School Clinic, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating Spiritual
Perspectiveswith the Law School Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
167 (2000).
64.

See Margaret E. Montoya, Introduction, Religious Rituals and LatCrit Theorizing, 19
L. REV. 417 (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Forward, The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism,66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1705 (1998);
see also Amelia J. Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic Legal
Education: Why Rock the Boat?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 921 (2004).
CHICANO-LATINO

65.

See

MILNER

S.

BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW:

ISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS

(1981);

THOMAS

L.

A

THEOLOGICAL, HUMAN-

SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS

1-

38 (1987).
66. See Steven K. Berenson, InstitutionalProfessionalismfor Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues
of Civic Professionalism, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 67 (2006) (book review) (remarking that the Foundation desires a resurgence of civic professionalism to challenge the dominance of technical
professionalism). See generally Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and
Professional Responsibility for the Administration of Justice for the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV,
1383 (1998) (noting that religion can positively impact civic obligations).
67. See Lucie E. White, CollaborativeLawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths From
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) (endorsing scholarly clinical projects that
"would envision the clinical training student-advocates need in order to work effectively with
[community] groups"); cf Linda F Smith, Why Clinical ProgramsShould Embrace Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Community Based Research, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 723 (2004)
(contending that law school clinics could benefit from the community service based learning movement).
68. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Story, Clinical Genesis in Miami, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1137
(2007). See generally Symposium, Race, Economic Justice, and Community Lawyering in the New
Century, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1821 (2007) (discussing community lawyering and the changing meaning of community).
69. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV.
355 (2008); Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in Supporting Public Interest Lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 569 (2007).
70. For prior groundwork in the practical uses of critical theory under the frameworks of
cultural studies, critical-outsider jurisprudence, pragmatism, and democratic theory, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, Essay, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805
(2008).
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multivariable and open-ended, and cast the process of lawyering as deriving
legitimacy through client participation.
The critical view of law as a social and cultural practice arises out of
cultural studies.7 Essential to the critical reflection of clinical practice,"
cultural studies scholarship denotes "lawyering" as an interpretive practice

applicable to multiple oral, written, and social texts in action. That interpretive practice locates the social reality of difference-based client and
community identity in the interwoven constructions of law, culture, and so-

ciety73 seen and heard for example within the congregations of the Historic
Black Churches of West Coconut Grove. Situating client or group identity in
law, culture, and society refutes neutral claims of a natural or necessary

mode of construction in advocacy and politics. From this standpoint, neither
the socioeconomic condition of the West Grove churches nor the socio-legal
identity of their congregations is attributable to a natural or necessary racial
order. In fact, both are constructed in the interpretive and material movements of law, culture, and society often captured within the "lawyering"
74

process.

The critical view of legal judgments as descriptively incomplete follows

from the insights of cultural studies and additionally borrows from criticaloutsider jurisprudence in treating identity as multifaceted and unstable.75

The constituent parts of critical-outsider jurisprudence---critical race theory,
feminist theory, and queer theory-proffer identity as a shifting aggregation
of multiple categories beyond stock accounts of race, gender, sexuality, or

71.
See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Introduction, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural
Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001)
("[Liegal scholarship itself should ... more fully embrace cultural analysis and cultural studies.").
72. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-critique and to Develop Critical Clinical
Self-awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143 (2006); Anahid Gharakhanian, ABA Standard 305's "Guided Reflections": A Perfect Fit for Guided Fieldwork, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 61
(2007). See generally DONALD A. SCH6N, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION (1983) (exploring how nonlegal professionals solve problems based on reflection
from practice); Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV.
231 (1995).
73. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1807 (1993).
74. See generally Margaret E. Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and
Clinical Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SoC. POL'Y & L. 161 (2005); Ann Shalleck, Theory and
Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who
Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019 (1997).
75. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL L. REV. 1143, 1152 (1997) ("[A]II racial identities, not least those of Mexican
Americans and Latinos/as more generally, are intelligible only as social constructions."); Imani
Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV.
915 (2005) (reflecting on "the usefulness of cultural studies to studies of race and the law"); Gerald
Torres & Katie Pace, Understanding Patriarchy as an Expression of Whiteness: Insights from the
Chicana Movement, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 129 (2005) (discussing how members of one ethnic
group might identify themselves as part of another); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence,
Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education,
10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003).
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religious faith.7 6 Acknowledging the multiple dimensions and changing

qualities of difference-based client and community identity renders "lawyering" judgments of fact and law incomplete and partial." Applied to the

congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this view counsels CEDAD's clinical students to proceed carefully in describing what they
see and hear, and to advance slowly in reaching judgments of client motiva-

tion and purpose.
The critical view of legal reasoning as multivariable and open-ended
draws from outsider jurisprudence coupled with the realist caution of prag-

matism.' Critical pragmatism contextualizes lawyer advocacy judgments
exposing legal reasoning as situational. 79 Entangled in the representation of
difference-based client and community identity, those practical judgments
produce highly contingent, provisional outcomes. s° The critical impulse of
pragmatism encourages revisiting the roles, relationships, and goals of client
and community representation in order to test the validity of "lawyering"

judgments in action.8 For CEDAD clinical students working in partnership
with the congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this
counterintuitive encouragement produces useful reflection and self-doubt
about "lawyering" solutions, as well as ongoing experimentation in develop-

ing community-based, participatory remedies.
The critical view of lawyering as legitimated through client participation

comes out of democratic theory.8 Engrafted on difference-based identity
76. See Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, Queering Legal Education: A Project of Theoretical
Discovery, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (2004); Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton ...And
Beyond: Some Thoughts on "OutsiderNarrative" in a Law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109
(1997); see also, Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 65 (1997).
77. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 (1997); Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing
Race from Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51 (1994).
78. See generally Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 18
(1996) (comparing realist caution of pragmatism).

CARDOZO

L.

REV.

153

79. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990);
Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Commentary, Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCritical
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1991); Daria Roithmayr, "Easy for You to Say": An Essay
on Outsiders,the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical Pragmatism,57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (2003).
80. See Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About PracticalJudgment
in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247 (1998) (positing effective practical judgment as a means to
discern differences in client and community identity); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, Ott Teaching
ProfessionalJudgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1994).
81.
See Alan M. Lemer, Law & Lawyering in the Work Place: Building Better Lawyers by
Teaching Students to Exercise CriticalJudgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV.
107 (1999); Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project,9 CLINICAL L. REV.
623 (2003).
82. See V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who's Listening? Introducing Students to ClientCentered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 93-96 (2002) (linking improved advocacy results to client participation and
empowerment). To address the breadth of community-wide economic, political, and legal challenges, problem-solving pedagogies must reach beyond the scope of individual client representation.
See Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategiesfor Involving Students inProblem-Solving Beyond Individual Client-Representation,8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405 (2002).
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and antisubordination practice norms, democratic legal theory encourages
client participation in the "lawyering" process through community-based
collaborations inside and outside of neighborhood church congregations.
Facilitating client participation in the "lawyering" process educates clients
in rights discourse, creating opportunities for individual empowerment and
collective mobilization." Empowerment and mobilization depend on educating clients in "lawyering" skills and training lay advocates to represent
underserved groups and communities. Civic engagement in fostering grassroots, democratic initiatives among clients and client groups helps transform
the standard conception of the "lawyering" process as lawyer driven and
professional identity as lawyer dominant. Joining the congregations of the
West Grove's Historic Black Churches in strategic planning about legalpolitical rights education and social-service capacity-building breaks away
from the standard conception of lawyer domination in community advocacy.
C. CriticalPedagogiesin Community Action:
The Historic Black Church Project

The Historic Black Church project is part of the University of Miami
Law School's ongoing nine-year effort to assist Miami's economically distressed West Coconut Grove community. Housed at the School's Center for
Ethics and Public Service, the project is spearheaded by the CEDAD Clinic,
a joint venture collaboration with the University's School of Architecture
and Florida Legal Services. The purpose of the project is to provide multidisciplinary resources in education, law, and social services to underserved
low-income residents by establishing congregation-based church partnerships through the West Grove's sixteen-church Ministerial Alliance.
Exemplifying critical pedagogies, the project combines poverty law instruction" and community-based skills training6 with student-centered ethical
and social development strategies to advance racial justice."

ING

83. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTPOWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could:

Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REv. 469;
Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399 (2001).
84. Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social
Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 217, 250-54 (1999).
85. See JoNel Newman, Essay, Re-Conceptualizing Poverty Law Clinical Curriculum and
Legal Services Practice: The Need for Generalists,34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1303, 1318-24 (2007).
See generally Marie A. Failinger, A Home of Its Own: The Role of Poverty Law in FurtheringLaw
Schools'Missions,34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1173 (2007).
86. See generally Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community
Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002) (discussing the diversity of skills
learned in a community economic development clinic); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building
as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445 (2002).
87. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Provocateursfor Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287 (2001);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 851 (2004); Jon C. Dubin,
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The project entails several interrelated experiential learning initiatives
encompassing rights-education seminars, capacity-building workshops, and
oral history church archive compilations." The project's rights-education
seminars address a wide range of topics affecting the West Grove's church
congregations, including children's health, education, elder law, tenants'
rights, homeowner protection, crime prevention, and voting rights. 9 The
church-based seminars afford both students and church activists the opportunity to learn substantive law while integrating critical pedagogies into
classroom and community settings. Legal analysis of this kind supplies students and activists with the constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal rules
needed to engage with the world through the medium of the law.
The project's capacity-building workshops, by comparison, focus on
community-wide economic development and nonprofit legal compliance. 90
These church-based workshops offer practical-skills training in financial
management and nonprofit governance spanning a variety of substantive
areas from corporate to tax law. Learning to assist client groups and organizations occurs through modeling, habituation, experiment, and reflection.
Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate pedagogies blending
formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction."
In contrast, the project's ongoing assembly of oral history church archives, 92 and the planned establishment of a national consortium on
Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461 (1998); Stephen Wizner, The
Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929 (2002).
88. See generally Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional
Law Curriculum Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDuc. 51 (2001) (describing the
benefits of experiential learning programs); James E. Molitemo, Legal Education, Experiential
Education, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 (1996) (same).
89. The Center For Ethics and Public Service Forms an alliance with black churches in West
Coconut Grove: Partners from the Pulpit, VERITAS, http://www6.riami.edu/veritas/summer2OO8/nb
nb.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
90. See Project Description, Community Economic Development and Design Clinic, Historic
Black Church Project (Fall 2008) (on file with author).
91.

See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10
L. REV. 191 (2003); Harriet N. Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and
Opportunitiesfor Law Schools, 59 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2008); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegregating the Law School Curriculum: How to Integrate More of the Skills and Values Identified by the
MacCrateReport Into a Doctrinal Course, 3 NEv. L.J. 32 (2002).
CLINICAL

92. The archives are compiled and stored at individual churches through a student-faculty
partnership with local schools in Coconut Grove. The oral histories of each congregation and ministry are assembled and videotaped by high school, undergraduate, and law students. Both high school
and undergraduate students also participate in faculty supervised multimedia projects (drawing,
painting, and photography) documenting the churches in conjunction with their congregations and
affiliated youth groups. See Project Description, supra note 90. Such multimedia projects offer
partnership opportunities with university fine arts departments and law school legal writing programs. Cf Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for Law Student
Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 429 (1999) (proposing to use legal research and writing
programs as a means of engaging students in pro bono work). See generally Sarah O'Rourke Schrup,
The Clinical Divide: Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration Between Clinics and Legal Writing
Programs, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 301 (2007) (advocating increased communication between legal
research and writing programs and clinical programs).
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campus-church-community collaboration linking faith-inspired civic engagement and service learning in higher education, work to invigorate
professionalism norms of social responsibility, historical witness, and ethical reflection." By plan, critical pedagogies stress the public purpose of the
profession. Fundamental to that purpose is the formation of professional
identity guided by other-regarding interests.94 Viewed against the backdrop
of the Historic Black Church project, both the formation and reformation of
professional identity is underway.
CONCLUSION

Joint law school-community initiatives like CEDAD's Historic Black
Church project enrich the mission of clinical education and legal education
more generally by addressing difference-based identities, contexts, and
communities through innovative theory/practice pedagogies. Both CEDAD
and the Carnegie Foundation advance these pedagogies in the hope of encouraging "more informed scholarship and imaginative dialogue about
teaching and learning for the law" and prodding legal educators to build "a
stronger commitment to the public mission and purpose of the vocation and
the institution they have chosen to serve" (p. 19). And yet, both the Foundation and CEDAD falter when they overlook the relevance of critical
pedagogies in teaching students how best to engage with difference-based
identity in the context of representing communities of color. The traditions
of civic professionalism help shape that engagement. The critical pedagogies arising out of the campus-community collaboration between CEDAD's
clinical law students and the West Grove's Historic Black Church congregations help ground it in mutual faith.

93.

P. 14; see also Peter A. Joy, Essay, The Law School Clinic as a Model Ethical Law Of-

fice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law
Office, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (1996).
94.

See Floyd, supra note 28.

